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THE FREE WILL DEFENSE AND DETERMINISM 
James F. Sennett 
Edward Wierenga has argued that the free will defense (FWD) is compatible 
with compatibilism (Faith and Philosophy, April 1988). I maintain that 
Wierenga is mistaken. I distinguish between the conceptual doctrine of com-
patibilism and the metaphysical doctrine of soft determinism, and offer ar-
guments that the FWD fails if either doctrine is true. Finally, I reconstruct 
Wierenga's argument and argue that it fails because either it is equivocal or 
it contains a false premise. 
Introduction 
Edward Wierenga has charged Alvin Plantinga with hastiness in the latter's 
concession that the free will defense (FWD) fails if compatibilism is true 
([6], p. 216-see [4], pp. 44-47).1 The major requirement of the FWD is that 
"if God causes someone else's action to occur it's not a free action." But this 
is perfectly consistent with compatibilism, which is the thesis that "it's pos-
sible that all actions are both free and caused-caused, that is, by antecedent 
conditions and not by the agent himself."2 
The consistency of these two claims is seen when we understand that "not 
just any cause is compatible with an action's being free; free actions have to 
have the right kind of cause." That is, the agent's beliefs and desires must be 
the principal causal elements, and these beliefs and desires must have arisen 
in the proper ways. They must not have been artificially manipulated or 
created. But this conception of free action entails that no one (hence, not even 
God) could cause a given agent to perform a free action. Only his desires and 
beliefs-properly formed and properly functioning-can cause him to do so. 
Hence, since compatibilism and the FWD both entail the same crucial the-
sis-that God cannot cause an agent to perform a free action-they need not 
be understood as being in conflict. As long as God does not cause the free 
actions that cause the evil, there is room for the free will defense. Thus 
Plantinga's concession that compatibilism defeats the FWD is unnecessary. 
I contend that Wierenga is wrong, and that Plantinga's original misgivings 
are essentially sound. 3 
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I. Preliminary Matters 
Determinism is the thesis that all events (including all actions) are causally 
detennined to occur by past events.4 The free will thesis is the thesis that there are 
some free actions. The compatibilist thesis is the thesis that detenninism and the 
free will thesis are compatible: it is possible that they both be true. Let us use 'D' 
for the proposition All events are causally determined and 'F' for the proposition 
There are some free actions. We may then construe the compatibilist thesis thus: 
CT: ¢ CD & F). 
Plantinga notes the "the canny compatibilist" will argue not simply that D and Fare 
compatible, but that an action is free only if it is detennined ([4], p. 46). Using "F*" 
for the predicate is a free action and 'D*' for the predicate is causally determined, 
we may then distinguish between a weak and a strong compatibilist thesis: 
WCT (=CT): ¢ (D & F) 
SCT: 0 (x) (F*x --+ D*X).5 
I will deal primarily with WCT, and refer to it simply as CT. 
The incompatibilist thesis is that F and D are inconsistent. That is (using 
'--, D' for the proposition Some events are not causally determined), 
IT: 0 (F --+ --, D). 
Note that CT and IT are both theses about the logical relation of the concepts of 
free action and causal detennination. Neither of these theses makes any asser-
tions at all about the metaphysical structure of the actual world. That is, both are 
consistent with D. They are also consistent with indeterminism, the thesis that 
some events are not causally detennined (Le., --, D). (Throughout this paper, it 
is assumed that if there are any undetennined events, they are actions. Questions 
of indetenninism on a quantum level are bracketed for the sake of simplicity.) 
In order for CT or IT to have metaphysical import, they must be coupled 
with D or --, D. There are two such couplings that interest us here. First, there 
is the libertarian thesis, which states that IT is true, and there are some free 
actions. That is, 'F & 0 (F -> --, D): The second conjunct of this sentence is 
inconsistent with CT. Assuming it would, therefore, beg the question against 
the compatibilist from the start. I therefore present a weaker formulation of 
the libertarian thesis for our purposes: 
L: --, D & F.6 
I will show before the end of this paper, however, that a successful FWD 
must entail not only L but the stronger formulation as well. Finally, there is 
soft determinism, which is the claim that both D and F are true (and a fortiori, 
CT is true). That is, 
SD: D & F. 
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A caveat is in order before going on. I do not pretend that L, CT, and SD 
capture all the conceptual richness of the philosophical doctrines of libertar-
ianism, compatibilism, and soft determinism. My formulations are, rather, 
distillations of the crucial features of these doctrines that bear on the FWD. 
Perhaps it is best to understand these formulae as entailed by the respective 
doctrines, rather than as representative of them. 
II. Plantinga's FWD 
a. The Defense 
Before discussing the bearing these distinctions have on Wierenga's claims, 
we must say a few words about Plantinga's specific formulation of the FWD. 
The FWD in general is the thesis that God is not responsible for the moral evil 
in the world, since it has come about as a result of free actions by human agents. 
Plantinga provides modal substance for this claim. He begins by noting that there 
are some possible worlds that God could not have actualized ([3], pp. 169ft). 
Consider a set of states of affairs {SI, S2, ... , Sn} such that its members are 
all God actualizes in bringing about the actual world. Call this set T(W). If 
there are free agents, then the actualization of T(W) does not determine that 
any particular world will come about. Rather, there is a set of possible worlds 
{WI, W2, ... WnJ? such that anyone of these worlds might be actualized as a 
result of the actualization of TCW). Call this set the range of T(W). 
Plantinga maintains that it is possible that the actual world (call it WI) is 
only one of many possible worlds that could have been actualized as a result 
of God's actualizing T(W). The crucial feature determining that WI be actual 
rather than any other Wi is the set of free actions actually performed. For any 
free action a performed by some agent J at a given time t, there are many 
possible worlds in the range of T(W) that are identical to W I prior to t and 
in which J refrains from performing a at t. Call one such world W2. WI and 
W2 both include T(W), but are not the same world. But it is not God's 
responsibility that WI rather than W 2-or any other Wi in the range of T(W)-
is actualized. It is rather the responsibility of J (or other free moral agents). 
Now, suppose WI contains more moral evil than W2.1t was within 1's power 
to actualize W2 rather than WI, but not within God's. God's power reaches 
its limit at the actualization of T(W).8 Hence the moral responsibility for the 
moral evil in WI rests not on God's shoulders, but on the shoulders of free 
agents. God (alone) could not actualize WI or W2 or any possible world 
containing free actions ([3], p. 172).9 
b. Plantinga's FWD and L 
It can be shown that Planting must assume L to be true in the foregoing 
development. Consider again time t, the time at which J performs a in W [. 
If Plantinga's FWD is to work, then for any time t' prior to t, it must be 
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possible, given the state of the world at t', both that J perform a at t and that 
J refrain from performing a at t. That is, at no time prior to t can the state of 
the world entail either that J perform a at t or that J refrain from performing 
a at t. This can be the case only if T(W) does not include the state of affairs 
All events in WI being causally determined to occur by events in WI.lO 
If we use 'A' for the proposition, J pe rforms a at t, '-, A' for J refrains from 
performing a at t, and 'Tg' for God actualizes T(W), then the above point 
can be made by asserting that both of the following two propositions must 
be true if Plantinga's FWD is to work: 
JA: 0 (Tg & A) 
and 
J ---, A: 0 (Tg & ---, A). II 
That is, the actualization of T(W) cannot be sufficient to determine whether 
A or -, A is true in WI. 
Now, suppose that D is true in WI. That is, one of the states of affairs included 
in T(W) is All events in WI being causally determined by events in WI. It follows 
that T(W) is sufficient to determine whether A or --, A is true. Since J's perform-
ing a at t is an event, either it or its complement will be ent;liled by T(W). So 
one (and, of course, only one) of the following propositions is true: 
(i) D --+ 0 (Tg --+ ---, A) 
or 
(ii) D --+ 0 (Tg -+ A). 
The consequents of (i) and (ii) are equivalent to the negations of JA and J --, A, 
respectively.12 So, given that D is true, JA and J --, A cannot both be true. That 
is, 
(iii) D -+ ---, (JA & J ---, A). 
Since Plantinga's FWD depends on JA and J --, A both being true, it depends on 
determinism being false. Since the FWD (naturally) depends on there being free 
actions, it follows that Plantinga's FWD presupposes L (--, D & F) to be true. 
III. Contra Wierenga 
Now we can return to Wierenga's contention that compatibilism is consis-
tent with the FWD. It is not clear whether he is claiming that CT is compatible 
with Plantinga's FWD, or just that it is possible to construct a FWD that is 
compatible with CT. I wi\l assume that he means the latte~, and will proceed 
to show that even this claim is false. I will make three points against 
Wierenga. First, I wi1\ argue that it is not so much CT as SD that is of concern 
to the free will defender, and SD is incompatible with the FWD. Second, I 
344 Faith and Philosophy 
will argue that even the weaker notion CT is incompatible with the FWD. 
Finally, in light of these arguments, I will show exactly where Wierenga's 
argument that CT is compatible with the FWD is flawed-it is either equiv-
ocal or unsound. 
a. SD and the FWD 
It is not clear that CT as specified above is the sense of 'compatibilism' 
that Plantinga is worried about when he states that the FWD is inconsistent 
with compatibilism. Rather, it seems that he has conflated the possibility of 
'D & F' with its actuality. For instance, he says, "[W]hat is at stake here, 
fundamentally, is the conception of agent causation" ([4], p. 46). But agent 
causation is inconsistent with SD, not CT. That it is possible that determinism 
be true in no way entails that agent causation is actually false. 
In fairness to Plantinga, I must point out that agent causation is also incon-
sistent with SCT (see page 341 above), which is actually what is bothering 
Plantinga at this point. But SCT plus F entails SD-given the proviso that 
all undetermined events are actions. Since the FWD depends on the assump-
tion that F is true, concern over SCT for the free will defender reduces to 
concern over SD. 
So perhaps Plantinga is more concerned with SD than with CT. At any rate, 
it does seem that it is SD that is really of interest to the free will defender. 
That is, is it possible that: (i) all events are determined, and (ii) there are 
some free actions, and (iii) the FWD successfully rebuts the argument from 
evil? If Wierenga thinks that he has successfully defended this claim, then 
he is mistaken. 
Consider the following argument: 
(1) Suppose that SD is true. 
(2) If God freely performs action A and knows that A will causally deter-
mine event B, then God is to some extent morally responsible for any 
moral significance B might have. 
(3) God's actualizing T(W) was a free action. 
(4) God is omniscient, and therefore knew that his actualizing T(W) would 
causally determine that W I be actualized. 
(5) The actualization of W I entails the actualization of the evil there is. 
(6) Therefore, God is to some extent morally responsible for the evil that 
there is. 
(7) If God is morally perfect, then he is in no way morally responsible for 
any evil. 
(8) Therefore, God is not morally perfect. 
(9) The FWD is intended to show that God's moral perfection is compatible 
with the evil in the world. 
(10) Therefore, the FWD fails. 
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE AND DETERMINISM 345 
(11) Therefore, if SD is true, the FWD fails. 
This argument has seven premises: (1) - (5), (7), and (9). Of these, (1) is the 
assumption for conditional proof, and is therefore above reproach. (3), (4), 
and (7) are data of any FWD. That is, they are points of agreement (for the 
sake of argument) between the problem of evil advocate and the free will 
defender. To deny any of them would be, it seems, to deny the need for a 
FWD. (5) is necessarily true, and (9) seems wholly unproblematic. 
This leaves (2). The crucial question to be raised against (2) is: What reason 
do we have to think that knowledge of causal determination entails some 
moral responsibility? After all, double-effect counterexamples seem to 
abound. A doctor can save a life-a good-only by amputating a limb-an 
evil. The doctor knows that his actions will causally determine the loss of a 
limb. But what sense can we make of the claim that he bears any moral 
responsibility for the loss of the limb? 
Perhaps the most effective way to defend premise (2) is to concede the 
examples, but to argue that the import of such cases does not extend to God's 
actions. Paramount in the double-effect scenario is the fact that the evil 
caused is an unavoidable means to a greater good. Were there any other, less 
morally costly way for the doctor to save the life, then he would be morally 
responsible if he chose to amputate rather than to take the better alternative. 
So an agent escapes moral responsibility for an evil event causally determined 
by his free action only if the evil was an unavoidable means to a greater 
good-only if, that is, the evil was justified in the strong sense that it con-
tributed to a greater good and was the only means (or a necessary condition 
for the only means) to that good. 
Let us look at the situation somewhat more formally. The doctor in our 
double-effect example above has two choices: (i) he amputates; or (ii) he 
does not amputate. The claim before us is 
(12) The doctor bears no moral responsibility for any evil determined by (i) 
only if 
(A) there is some state of affairs S such that (i) causally determines 
S;and 
(B) there is no state of affairs S* such that 
(a)S* includes (ii); 
(b)it is in the doctor's power to actualize S* or to causally de-
termine that S* be actualized; 
(c)there is some state of affairs S** such that 
(a) S* causally determines S**; and 
(13) S** is morally preferable to S (i.e., S** contains a balance 
of moral good over moral evil preferable to that of S); and 
(d)the doctor knows that (b) and (c). 
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The general principle underlying (12) can be specified to God's actualization 
of T(W) (allowing for certain entailments given that worlds are maximally 
consistent states of affairs) thus: 
(13) God bears no moral responsible for the evil determined by his actual-
izing T(W) only if WI (causally determined by the actualization ofT(W) 
is such that there is no W* such that 
(a) it is in God's power to actualize W* or to causally determine that 
W* be actualized l3 ; 
(b) W* is morally preferable to W I (i.e., W* contains a balance of moral 
good over moral evil preferable to that of WI); and 
(c) God knows that (a) and (b). 
Given God's omniscience, condition (c) is met trivially for any world in 
which (a) and (b) are true. W* meets conditions (a) and (b) of (13) just in 
case it is an SD world and it is a morally better world than W 1.14 Since (13) 
claims that God is not morally responsible for the evil in WI only if there is 
no world meeting conditions (a) and (b), it follows that God is not morally 
responsible for the evil in W I only if there is no SD world morally preferable 
to WI. Hence, if all events are causally determined, God is morally justified 
in actualizing T(W) only if WI is the best possible world in which SD is 
true. IS 
But obviously this is not the case. Consider two counterexamples, one very 
modest, the other very extreme. The first is a world as close to WI as possible, 
except that Ted Bundy never commits any of the horrible evils he actually 
committed. Certainly such a world is better-however minutely-than the 
actual one. If both are worlds in which SD is true, then both are worlds God 
could have causally determined while preserving human freedom. The ex-
treme case is one reminiscent of John Mackie's classic objection to the FWD. 
Mackie asked why God did not create only those free moral agents whom he 
knew would always freely choose to do good ([1], pp. 56f). In the present 
context we can ask, why did God not actualize a world in which SD is true 
and the causal chains are such that all free moral agents are determined freely 
to choose only the good? 
Here it is crucial to note that Plantinga's FWD is a direct response to 
Mackie's objection ([2], pp. 135-49; [3], pp. 167-68). So it is no mistake that 
Plantinga's FWD requires that L be true. He argues that it might not be 
possible for God to create free moral agents that freely choose only the 
good-or even that freely choose to actualize more good and less evil than 
is in WI. What these free creatures do is ultimately up to them, not up to God. 
But if SD is true, then what they freely do is ultimately up to God. 
The libertarian can be content that this is not the best possible world in 
which L is true. However, a soft determinist who wishes to construct a FWD 
is saddled with the enormous task of arguing that this is the best of all possible 
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SD worlds. In light of the above plausible counterexamples, I cannot see how 
this task could be accomplished. Hence, I believe that (2) is true, and the 
argument against an SD-FWD is sound. 
Why, then, does (2) speak only of God's being "to some extent morally 
responsible" for B? Why not, in light of the above development, simply 
charge that all blame for evil is his? To do so would be to beg the question 
against the soft determinist, who typically claims that the fact of determinism 
does not absolve an agent from moral blameworthiness or exclude her from 
moral praiseworthiness. (2) is worded as it is in order to make room for 
responsibility for evil on the part of other agents besides God. If J freely 
performs a (in the SD sense), then J may be to some extent morally respon-
sible for any evil a causes, so God is not wholly to blame. But, as (7) points 
out, any moral responsibility would be inconsistent with God's moral perfec-
tion. In order for the FWD to work, God must be exonerated from all blame-
worthiness for evil. If SD is true, he is not so exonerated. 16 
b. CT and the FWD 
So even if CT is compatible with the FWD, SD is not, and it is SD that is 
actually of concern to the free will defender. But the previous argument can 
help us see that even CT, as weak as it is, is also incompatible with a suc-
cessful FWD.17 
Suppose that the following three propositions are true: 
(14) ¢ (D & F) [=CT) 
(15) ..., (D & F) 
(16) There is a possible world W* such that (D & F) is true in W* and W* 
contains less evil than WI. 
It follows from these propositions that God need not have permitted all the 
evil there is, since he could have had both free will and causally determined 
actions. If CT is true in WI, then there are worlds in which SD is true. (16) 
asserts that at least one SD world has less evil than WI (consider, for example, 
the Mackie SD world discussed in the previous section). Therefore, God 
needed simply to have actualized the appropriate states of affairs so as to 
causally determine such a world. God could have created a world in which 
there are free creatures and less evil than WI, but he did not. Therefore, God 
seems again to be in some way responsible at least that there is the amount 
of evil that there is, in much the same way that he is if SD is true. CT, like 
SD, is incompatible with a FWD alleviation of such divine blame. If (14) -
(16) are all true, then even compatibilism in the very weak form CT is 
incompatible with the FWD (note that (16) is necessarily true if true at all). 
Notice that I have now shown what I promised to show early in the 
paper. Since even CT is incompatible with the FWD, a successful FWD 
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must assume not just L, but the stronger formulation of libertarianism 
given above: 'F & D (F -+ --, D).' If it is even possible that'D & F' be true, 
then the FWD fails. IS 
c. Wierenga on CT and the FWD 
But what of Wierenga's argument that causal determinism is consistent 
with the claim that free actions are not caused by God, and that this latter 
claim is all the FWD needs? Where did it go wrong? Our previous discussions 
put us in a position to see its shortcomings. 
I understand Wierenga's argument to be: 
(17) Causal detenninism is compatible with the claim that no free action is 
caused by God. 
(IS) The proposition No free action is caused by God entails that the FWD 
is successful. 19 
(19) Therefore, causal detenninism is compatible with the FWD.20 
Either this argument is equivocal or it contains a false premise. The sense of 
'caused by God' that the FWD needs to succeed is not 'proximately or 
appropriately caused,' or 'caused in a way incompatible with free will.' As 
we saw above, the FWD also requires that God not cause actions in such a 
way that he bears any moral responsibility for any evil resulting from the 
action. But, as we have seen, the compatibilist sense of 'caused' is consistent 
with God's being so responsible to some extent, even though he does not 
interfere with the compatibilist freedom of any agents. 
If 'caused by God' in (17) and (18) above means only 'proximately or 
appropriately caused,' -that is, 'caused in a way incompatible with free 
wiIl'-then (18) is equivalent to 
(IS*)The proposition No free action is caused by God in a way that is 
incompatible with its being a free action entails that the FWD is suc-
cessful. 
We have seen that the FWD fails unless God is absolved of all moral responsi-
bility evil. Yet the two arguments above show that if either SD or CT is true, 
God bears some moral responsibility. Since the proposition in italics in (18*) is 
compatible with SD and CT, it cannot entail the success of the FWD, since both 
SD and CT entail that the FWD fails. 21 Hence, if 'caused by God' is read simply 
as 'caused in a way incompatible with its being a free action,' then (18) is false. 
On the other hand, if 'caused by God' in (17) and (18) is read as 'caused 
in such a way that God, and not just the agent, bears some moral responsibility 
for any evil resulting from the action,' then (17) is equivalent to 
(17*) Causal detenninism is compatible with the claim that no free action is 
caused in such a way that God bears some moral responsibility for any 
evil resulting from the action. 
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The arguments above show that, given either CT or SD, God's actualizing 
T(W) is sufficient to make him morally responsible to some extent for the 
evil that there is. (17*) entails the denial of such sufficiency, and is therefore 
false. Hence, if we take the second reading of 'caused by God,' then (17) is 
false. 
The only way to get two true premises to Wierenga's argument is to inter-
pret 'caused by God' in (17) as 'caused in a way incompatible with free will' 
and in (18) as 'caused in such a way that God is to some extent morally 
responsible for any evil resulting from the action.' But then, of course, the 
argument is equivocal and invalid. 
Conclusion 
Plantinga is right to be concerned with the incompatibility of SD (or even 
CT) and the FWD. The truth of either of these propositions entails that the 
FWD will not relieve God from at least some moral responsibility for some 
evil. And Wierenga's defense of the compatibility of compatibilism and the 
FWD does nothing to alleviate this concern. 
But Plantinga and other free will defenders need not despair. It is by no 
means a foregone conclusion that CT, SD, or even D is true. There are still 
many libertarians alive and well, and even the plethora of soft determinists 
and compatibilists permeating the philosophical ranks today lacks anything 
by way of a conclusive argument.22 Given the undecided nature of these 
theses, the libertarian view is still epistemically possible. Apparently it is 
possible that one be rational in accepting libertarianism in the strong or weak 
senses explicated, and hence in rejecting SD or even CT. Since Plantinga 
intends the FWD to be a tool in establishing the rationality of theistic belief, 
it may still stand as a successful rebuttal of the argument from evil, even if 
SD or CT is true. All that is required is that one be rational in believing them 
to be false. 23 
Pacific Lutheran University 
NOTES 
1. All quotations of Wierenga in this and the following paragraph are from page 216 of 
[4]. All italics are his. 
2. As stated, Wierenga's formulation of compatibilism may be too strong. The com-
patibilist need not claim that it is possible that all actions be both free and caused, but 
only that some actions be both. It is the incompatibilist thesis-that no free action is caused 
(or, more accurately, causally determined)-that is the stronger position. See the discus-
sion of these theses later in the paper. See also note 5 below. 
3. Plantinga has related to me in conversation that he is impressed with Wierenga's 
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point, and has decided he was wrong to see compatibilism and the FWD to be incompat-
ible. If I am right, then Plantinga is in the enviable position of the mythical professor who 
claimed he was only wrong once-when he thought he was mistaken about something, 
but it turned out he was not! 
4. The question of whether or not facts or states of affairs can be causal factors will be 
bracketed for sake of simplicity. Por those worried about such matters, the definition of 
determinism can simply be amended to read "the thesis that all events are causally 
determined to occur by past events and facts." 
5. Note that CT as here construed (WCT) is Wierenga's formulation, and not the weaker 
thesis alluded to in note 2 above. Hence, there is a third possibility-a still weaker 
compatibilist thesis: 
SWCT: 0 (3 x)(P*x & D*x). 
I retain CT - Wierenga's formulation-for simplicity. Since CT is compatible with L (see 
below), I need not worry about SWCT (which is a fortiori compatible with L). 
6. A more accurate characterization would be 'P & (P ...... -, D),' which is, of course, 
equivalent to '-, D & F.' And, given the assumption that all undetermined events are free 
actions, the two formulations have the same philosophical import. I retain the more explicit 
latter characterization for simplicity. 
A further notion, which is not crucial to the current discussion is hard determinism, the 
thesis that IT is true and D is true-that is, 
D & 0 (P -+ -, D). 
The weaker formulation, parallel to L and compatible with CT, would be 
D&-,F. 
7. The set may be infinite (i.e., {W 1> W2, ... ), but this is irrelevant to the present point. 
8. Plantinga argues in [3] that this thesis is compatible with God's omnipotence. 
9. Plantinga distinguishes between weak and strong actualization. God strongly actual-
izes a state of affairs S just in case God's action is sufficient to bring about S. God weakly 
actualizes S just in case God's action alone is not sufficient to bring about S, but God's 
action plus the free action of some other agent (or agents) is sufficient to bring about S. 
Thus God strongly actualizes T(W) and weakly actualizes WI' 
10. Technically, since WI is a set of states of affairs (as are all possible worlds for 
Plantinga), it includes no events at all. The state of affairs that T(W) must exclude is 
actually something like All events described in propositions whose correspondillg states 
of affairs are members of WI being causally determilled to occur by other evellts described 
by propositions whose correspondillg states of affairs are members of WI. I retain the 
shorthand version in the text, sacrificing accuracy for simplicity. The idea, I think, is not 
as difficult to grasp as is its exact expression to formulate. So also with several other 
intuitive but technically inaccurate statements regarding possible worlds in this paper. 
11. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy for these formulations 
of JA and J -, A, which are marked improvements over previous formulations of mine. 
12. Re.: the negation of JA: 
-,0 (Tg & A) ..... 0 -, (Tg & A) ..... 0 (Tg -+ -, A). 
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Re.: the negation of J -, A: 
-, 0 (Tg & -, A) ..... D -, (Tg & -, A) +-+ D (Tg -+ A). 
13. This is, of course, strong actualization (see note 9 above). 
14. I claim that W* must be an SD world rather than simply a D world on the assumption 
that one world can be morally preferable to another only if it is a world with free actions 
for which agents are morally responsible. Even if my assumption is false, however, no 
harm is done. Condition (a) of (13) entails that W* is a D world. Since all SD worlds are 
D worlds, my assumption actually strengthens the requirement for W* if anything. I show 
in the following text that there are SD worlds meeting conditions (a) and (b), so my point 
succeeds even if one believes that it is possible that a world be deterministic, void of free 
actions, and morally better than WI. 
15. I do not say simply "best possible world," because if L is possibly true, then there 
may be some possible worlds better than the actual world, but such that L is true in those 
worlds and they are worlds such that the relevant free moral agents would choose not to 
actualize them. These would be possible worlds that God could not actualize, since he 
would need assistance of libertarian free creatures that would not be forthcoming. So there 
could be possible worlds better than the actual world such that God could not actualize 
those worlds (and hence is not responsible for not actualizing them)-but none of them 
would be SD worlds. 
16. For the sake of simplicity I am understanding moral responsibility to be equivalent 
to moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. This is a far too simple and perhaps 
misleading assumption. Exploration of the distinctions would take us too far afield, 
however, and I do not see that it would be particularly helpful in adjudicating my claims. 
William Barrett has asked whether or not there is a paradoxical shift implicit in this 
argument, in that the question of God's moral responsibility in the actualization of T(W) 
is a reversion back to the notion of libertarian freedom. That is, am I not assuming that 
God's actualizing of T(W) was free in the libertarian sense, and it is only by assuming 
such that I am able to find him morally culpable? While I believe that God's free actions 
are free in the libertarian sense (as I believe all free actions to be), my assumption of his 
culpability in the actualizing of T(W) is not dependent on this. The general principle of 
moral responsibility underlying (12) and (13) is neutral to the question of whether the 
freedom involved is libertarian or compatibilistic. I believe it is a true principle of moral 
responsibility even if the SD sense of freedom is the correct one. It is not that God is a 
libertarian free agent (whether or not we are) that makes him guilty for the evil in WI 
given (13). He is guilty by a principle of moral responsibility that holds even in SD worlds. 
17. I am grateful to Patrick Francken for the following argument. 
18. There are actually two possible scenarios under which a CT-FWD might be thought 
to work. The first is to claim that SD freedom, even if possible, would be inferior to L 
freedom to the point that any L world, just on the strength of its merit as an L world, 
would be better than any SD world. The second is to claim that there are SD worlds, and 
even SD worlds such that the balance of good over evil in them is preferable to WI. 
However, every SD world is one in which God does not exist, hence is a world which 
God could not actualize. This latter argument is tantamount to the claim that it is 
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necessarily true that, if God actualizes a world with human freedom, such freedom is 
libertarian-a claim I see little difficulty in endorsing. 
My only response to these two cases is that, if we grant either starting point (that all L 
worlds are better than all SD worlds, or that God actualizes no SD world), there seems to 
be no motivation for a CT-FWD at all, since each of these cases entails that W \ is an L 
world (given the FWD provisos that W \ is an F world and that God is morally perfect). 
It seems that the strength of a CT-FWD would be in its power to show that, even if WI 
were an SD world, the FWD would still be successful in W \. Both cases above entail that 
this is false, and hence gut the force of the CT-FWD. That is, both arguments entail that 
the FWD fails in any SD world with moral evil. By contrast, I suggest that a CT-FWD is 
successful only if it entails (a) that there is at least one SD world in which the FWD is 
successful and (b) for all we know, WI is just such a world. Under such an assumption, 
the two arguments above fail as CT-FWD's. At the very least, I want to claim that a 
CT-FWD is philosophically and theologically interesting only if it meets these two 
conditions. 
I am grateful to Vic Reppert for the latter case, and to Hugh Chandler for the former 
(who, in tum, credits it to St. Anselm-though he did not, I assume, learn of it through 
personal conversation). 
19. Given other premises not in question here; e.g., "God is morally responsible for 
moral evil only ifhe causes the free actions that cause the evil"; and "The FWD succeeds 
if it shows that God is not morally responsible for moral evil." 
20. If P is compatible with Q, and Q entails R, then P is compatible with R. 
21. If P entails ~ Q and R is compatible with p, then R cannot entail Q. 
22. For a very fine recent defense of libertarianism, see Peter van Inwagen, An Essay 
on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
23. Many acknowledgements must be made for this paper's achieving its final form. 
First, I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga, Joe Mendola, and Patrick Francken for helpful 
discussions leading to its original formulation. Second, I thank Dave Reiter for insightful 
comments on two earlier versions. Third, I offer thanks to the participants of the lith 
annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois in April 1989, before 
whom a version was read, with special thanks to William Barrett for thoughtful prepared 
comments. I am especially grateful to Barrett for a colorful and accurate condensation of 
the paper's thesis: an "analysis of the viability of the free will defense ... in view of Edward 
Wierenga's claim that compatibilism is in fact compatible with the kind of free will that 
makes the free will defense defensible." Finally, thanks are due to William Alston and to 
two anonymous Faith and Philosophy referees, who offered penetrating comments on an 
earlier version. 
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